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Using recent pooled data from several developed nations, the paper uniquely examines whether the 
composition of payment instruments has a bearing on the prevalence of corruption in a country. Our 
results suggest that the choice of instruments matters. Paper credit transfer transactions are consis-
tently associated with corrupt activities, while credit card transactions tend to reduce them. Cheques 
generally increase corruption, the results with respect to nonpaper credit transfers are mixed, while 
direct debits fail to show significant effects on corruption. These findings hold for alternative cor-
ruption measures and when allowance is made for endogeneity of payment instruments. 
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Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan kehittyneiden maiden paneeliaineistoa käyttäen, onko käytetyillä 
maksutavoilla merkitystä korruption yleisyyden kannalta eri maissa. Tulosten mukaan maksutavoil-
la on merkitystä. Paperipohjaisten tilisiirtojen yleisyydellä on positiivinen yhteys korruption kanssa, 
kun taas luottokorttitapahtumien yleisyys vähentää korruptiota. Sekkien käyttö yleensä lisää korrup-
tiota, ei-paperipohjaisten tilisiirtojen merkitys vaihtelee ja suoraveloituksen yleisyydellä ei ole mer-
kitystä korruption kannalta. Tulokset ovat robusteja kestäviä käytetystä korruption indikaattorista 
riippumatta ja kun mahdollinen maksutavan endogeenisuus otetaan huomioon. 
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1  Introduction  
 
The nature of payment instruments in financial transactions may generally affect illegal activity in a 
given country. Agents engaging in illegal activities try to hide their gains by various means to avoid 
detection and punishment.  Obviously, cash transactions are the most difficult to trace for law en-
forcement purposes, but face the drawback of being bulky and thus difficult to haul in large quanti-
ties.  Thus cash payments decrease the transactions costs of corrupt acts, but may be associated with 
the possibility of the bribe taker (i.e., government officials with monopoly powers) reneging on the 
commitment, since cash transactions are less traceable. Even other modes, such as cheques and 
credit  cards  have  qualitative  differences  that  affect  their  usefulness  to  criminals  and  other  law 
breakers.  For instance, cheques may be relatively more difficult to trace than credit card payments. 
Whereas the economics literature has examined numerous determinants of cross-national 
corruption, we formally investigate, to our knowledge for the first time in the literature (see Aidt 
(2003), Lambsdorff (2006a), Svensson (2005), Treisman (2000) for literature reviews), whether the 
prevalence of different types of payment instruments affects the prevalence of corruption (see La 
Porta et al. (1997) for a broader discussion).  Specifically, using recent pooled data from a number 
of developed nations, this paper examines whether the composition of payment instruments (e.g., 
paper versus nonpaper credit transfers, cheques versus credit cards) has a bearing on the prevalence 
of corruption in a country.  Corrupt transactions involving bribe payments between corrupt officials 
and bribers may be a bigger problem in nations where cash transactions are more common. Corrupt 
officials prefer cash payments for their anonymity, but storing large amounts of cash can be prob-
lematic.  Thus they might use bank accounts under pseudo names to facilitate acceptance of bribe 
payments by cheque.  In contrast, credit card or direct debit transactions are rather difficult to con-
duct anonymously (clandestinely).  Besides contributing to the literature, our findings may have 
value for policymakers looking to control corruption. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses data issues and 
presents the methodology of the study. This is followed by the estimation results in Section 3 and 
robustness checks in Section 4. The final section provides concluding remarks.  
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2  Theoretical background and data 
 
Scholars  investigating the causes of corruption  routinely borrow from the broader literature on 
crime and punishment that considers lawbreakers (bribe takers and bribe givers) as economic agents 
weighing the relative costs and benefits of their actions (see Becker (1968), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993)).   
Cash transactions may also be prevalent in the countries with large shadow economies. 
Dreher and Schneider (2010) suggest that corruption and the shadow economy may be comple-
ments in countries with low income. Related research on corruption and the financial system has 
identified a link between corruption and capital account restrictions (Dreher and Siemers, 2009). 
These authors note that corrupt countries may be more likely to impose capital controls because 
they are less able to collect taxes. In the presence of capital controls, individuals who want to make 
international transactions may offer bribes to avoid such restrictions, which adds to corruption. In a 
recent related study, Takala and Viren (2010) evaluate whether the behavior of cash balances can be 
useful in monitoring changes in the shadow economy. Their results indicate that cash demand in the 
euro area can be well explained by economic and institutional factors, without including an impor-
tant role for the shadow economy.   
Corrupt exchanges between bribe takers and bribe givers might be more prevalent when fi-
nancial payments are less easy to trace – as in the case of cash transactions. This aspect is examined 
in the empirical analysis that follows.    
 
Hypothesis: Corruption will be more prevalent in economies where there is greater use of pa-
per transactions 
 
2.1    Empirical setup 
 
Two widely used measures of cross-national corruption, from Transparency International and the 
World Bank, are employed as our dependent variables. These corruption indices provide a reason-
able cross-section comparison of the prevalence of corruption, but they are less amenable to time 
series interpretation (see www.transparency.de; Lambsdorff (2006b)). To partially overcome this 
shortcoming, we use a three-year moving average of each corruption index. The indices were fur-
ther modified via a logarithmic transformation to unbind them (for consistency with the underlying 
estimation methodology employed) and for ease of interpretation (i.e., higher values of the trans-
formed indices mean more corruption).  
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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The baseline model follows the literature by including “established” controls for corrup-
tion,  including  economic  prosperity,  democracy  and  government  size  (Gundlach  and  Paldam 
(2009), Serra (2006)).  Economic prosperity has been shown to reduce corruption (by increasing the 
opportunity costs of illegal acts (see Bardhan (1997)), while the findings in the literature for the ef-
fects of democracy and government size are mixed (Lambsdorff (2006a)). The sum of the country’s 
political rights and civil liberties provided by Freedom House are included as a measure of democ-
racy. Goel and Nelson (2005) and Tavares (2007) have shown that the level of democracy has an 
impact on the perception of corruption, while Montinola and Jackman (2002) note that the relation 
between political competition and corruption may be nonlinear. See also the cross-country studies 
by Jain (2001) and Lambsdorff (2006a). Finally, the GDP-share of general government final con-
sumption expenditure captures the size of the government.  Government size contributes to corrup-
tion by increasing bureaucracy and red tape, and can reduce corruption if a larger government is 
associated with greater checks and balances (Rose-Ackerman (1999)). 
The baseline model is augmented to focus on the objective of this study, by including sev-
eral different financial instruments.  These include paper and nonpaper credit transfers by nonbanks, 
credit card transactions, cheques and direct debits.  These different measures capture the qualitative 
differences in payment instruments in terms of their impact on corruption.  Allowance is also made 
for possible reverse causality between corruption and some payment instruments, e.g. the preva-
lence of corruption might dictate the choice of payment instruments. 
The estimated equations take the general forms 
        Corruptionijt = f(Economic prosperity (GDPit), Government size (GOVTit),  
         Democracy (DEMit), Financial payment instrumentsimt)      (3)  
         i = Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,  Singapore, Sweden,  
        Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States    
        j = CPIavg, WBavg 
        m = Share of nonpaper based credit transfers (ShNPAPR),  Paper based credit transfers        
       (ShPAPR), Cheque transactions (ShCHQ), Credit card transactions (ShCC), Direct debit trans   
       actions (ShDrDbt) 
      t = 2004,…, 2008 
 
The dependent variable in all our regressions is a corruption perceptions index, from either 
Transparency  International  or  the  World  Bank.  These  indices  have  been  widely  used  in  cross-Rajeev K. Goel and Aaron Mehrotra 
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national studies of corruption (see Lambsdorff (2006a,b)).  We estimate the models initially by 
pooled OLS. All estimated models include as controls GDP per capita, size of government, and 
various combinations of the financial payment instruments.
1 In order to control for possible en-
dogeneity between corruption and credit transactions, we conduct additional estimations by two-
stage least squares, using economic freedom and population as instruments for the share of paper 
and nonpaper based credit transfers, respectively.  
 
2.2    Data 
 
In order to tackle the main research question at hand, we use data on financial payment instruments 
provided by the Bank for International Settlements. Data on payment instruments cover the follow-
ing:  paper  (ShPAPR)  and  nonpaper  (ShNPAPR)  based  credit  transfers,  cheque  transactions 
(ShCHQ), credit card transactions (ShCC) and direct debit transactions (ShDrDbt).  In this context, 
paper transactions include, but are not limited to, cheques; while nonpaper transactions include 
credit cards and direct debits, among other payment instruments.  All variables are expressed as the 
instrument’s share of total transactions and concern the transfers by the non-banking sector.   
The instruments paper and nonpaper based credit transfers, together with direct debit trans-
actions, fall into the category of retail funds transfers (see BIS (1999)). These are used for remote 
payments. Credit transfers are payments initiated by the payer, such as giro payments, and they can 
be either in paper or electronic form. The latter are represented by our variable “nonpaper based 
credit transfers”. In contrast, direct debit transfers are initiated by the payee (potential bribe taker in 
our case). These are generally processed in electronic form, often in the context of a preauthorized 
agreement with the payer (bribe giver).  
Cheque transactions involve an instruction to the payer’s financial institution to debit the 
payer’s account for a specified amount (see BIS (1999)). In such case, the amount is to be trans-
ferred to the payee’s financial institution for credit or paid out in cash. Both remote and face-to-face 
payments by cheque are possible, as are single transactions and recurring payments.  
Finally, credit card transactions include those made with charge cards (under a short-term 
fixed-period credit arrangement) and cards with revolving credit arrangements (BIS (1999)). In the 
latter case, there is a partial minimum payment at the end of each billing period, with the balance of 
accumulated credits charged to the cardholder’s revolving credit line. Credit card transactions usu-
                                                 
1 Following the literature (see Serra (2006)), we also included democracy in all the regressions.  However, since most of 
the countries in the sample are highly democratic, there was not enough variation in the resulting variable in most of the 
models estimated.  
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ally involve non-recurring face-to-face payments, but electronic commerce systems, such as those 
in the internet, are increasingly used.  
While all countries in the sample are advanced economies, there is enough variability in 
the corruption indices and in the use of various payment instruments to make the investigation 
meaningful. In our sample, Italy was the most corrupt nation, and Singapore was the “cleanest”.  
The data employed include annual observations over 2004-2008 for the following nations: Belgium, 
Canada,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,  Singapore,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  UK  and 
USA.  Government consumption was the highest in Sweden and the lowest in Singapore, as defined 
by GOVT in Table 1.  Further, the share of nonpaper credit transactions ranged from a high of 97 
percent in the U.K. to a low of 15 percent in Italy. Details on the definitions of variables, summary 
statistics and data sources are provided in Table 1.  The size and scope of the data for the study are 
constrained by the availability of data on the financial variables.   
 [Table 1 here] 
 
3  Results 
 
Our estimation results are reported in Table 2.  All estimations were performed using the STATA 
computer software.  Table A1 in the Appendix provides the correlation coefficients of the different 
variables. Not surprisingly, the corruption perception indices by Transparency International and the 
World Bank are closely correlated with each other. Perhaps more surprising are the rather high cor-
relations (in absolute value) between the shares of paper and nonpaper based credit transfers with 
the corruption indices. All other correlation coefficients between variables are relatively low.  The 
overall fit of the OLS regressions in Table 2 is quite decent, as shown by the statistically significant 
F-values and R
2s.  The following additional points are noteworthy. 
  Panel A of Table 2 provides the results for the case in which the dependent variable is the 
corruption perception index of Transparency International and the estimations are carried 
out by pooled OLS. In these regressions, the share of nonpaper transactions is negative and 
statistically significant. This indicates that an increase in nonpaper based credit transactions 
is associated with less corruption. Conversely, with equal or higher statistical significance, 
the share of paper-based transactions is positively linked with the perception of corruption. Rajeev K. Goel and Aaron Mehrotra 
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Besides the relative ease of hiding paper bribe payments from scrutiny, another aspect that 
might contribute to a lower corruption measure for nonpaper transactions is that with non-
paper transactions the middleman in corrupt relations is likely to be eliminated (or sidelined) 
– a corrupt official can send a subordinate or agent to accept a cash bribe, but if the payment 
comes via an electronic medium, the bribe payer has to deal directly with the bribe taker.   
  Nonlinear effects are important for both variables, as both the negative effect of nonpaper 
based credit transactions and the positive effect of paper-based ones are weakened by taking 
the squared values.  Further, the magnitude of the quadratic term for paper transactions is 
about double that for nonpaper transactions (Models 2A.4 and 2B.4).  
  Increased use of credit cards in transactions is consistently associated with lower corruption.  
This is because credit card transactions are relatively easy to trace and there is some pre-
screening involved in the granting of credit cards.  
  The use of cheques appears to have a positive link with the perception of corruption.  Che-
ques share some of the same qualitative attributes as cash since chequing accounts are rela-
tively easy to operate under aliases by bribe takers and bribe givers.  In terms of magnitudes, 
a one percent increase in credit card use reduces corruption by about ten times the amount 
by which a similar increase in cheque usage increases corruption. 
  The share of direct debit does not appear to matter for the perception of corruption.  These 
transactions are quite difficult to conduct anonymously, making them somewhat undesirable 
for corrupt transactions.  
  Regarding the control variables, consistent with the extant literature, economic prosperity is 
associated with lower corruption (Paldam and Gundlach (2009), Serra (2006)), as is greater 
democracy (Goel and Nelson (2005)).  
  Somewhat less consistent results are obtained for government size, as the sign of the gov-
ernment consumption variable changes when we move from model 2A.4 to model 2A.5.  A  
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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plausible explanation is that the role of the government is multifaceted and complex (see 
Rose-Ackerman (1999)), so that it is difficult for a single aggregate measure to capture the 
various institutional nuances of government activities. This is consistent with the observa-
tion by Montinola and Jackman (2002). 
[Table 2 here] 
Overall, our results indicate that the choice of instruments matters. Paper credit transfer 
transactions  consistently  add  to  corrupt  activities,  while  credit  card  transactions  restrain  them. 
Cheque  usage  generally  increases  corruption,  and  the  results  for  nonpaper  credit  transfers  are 
mixed. We are unable to find any significant effects of direct debit transfers on corruption.  The 
contrast between the corruption effects of paper versus nonpaper transactions and cheques versus 
credit cards is the theme that consistently holds across regressions.  The relatively robust findings 
are especially significant in light of the fact that the countries in our sample are generally the less 
corrupt nations based on the corruption perception indices. 
 
 
4  Robustness checks 
 
We performed several robustness checks to test the validity of our findings.  These involve an alter-
nate measure of corruption perceptions and allow for possible simultaneity between corruption and 
payment instruments. 
 
4.1    Using an alternate measure of corruption 
 
In Panel B of Table 2, the results using the World Bank’s corruption index are presented. This pro-
vides an alternate measure of the dependent variable, although the correlation between the two cor-
ruption indices employed is high (see Table A1 in the Appendix). These largely confirm the results 
of Panel A, even regarding the sizes of the coefficients.  Again, the sharp distinction obtains be-
tween the effects of paper versus nonpaper transactions and cheques versus credit cards.  The results 
also support the nonlinearities in the effects of paper and nonpaper transactions. Rajeev K. Goel and Aaron Mehrotra 
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4.2    Allowing for reverse feedback from corruption to financial instruments 
 
We allow for the possibility that the results in Table 2 may suffer from reverse causality, and that 
the prevalence of corruption may have an impact on the use of various payment instruments in a 
country. Table 3 accordingly presents two-stage least squares estimates where the share of paper 
and nonpaper based transactions are instrumented by economic freedom and population, respec-
tively. The first-stage F-value and the Sargan overidentification test largely confirm the validity of 
this instrument set (the instrument selection is not rejected at the 5% level). The findings for the 
shares of paper and nonpaper based transactions accord with those reported in Table 2. An increase 
in the share of nonpaper based transactions reduces corruption, while an increase in the share of pa-
per-based transactions leads to an increase in corruption. The level of economic prosperity is again 
negatively linked to perceived corruption in a country. In these estimations, government size always 
has a negative impact on the perception of corruption. 
 
 
5  Concluding Remarks 
 
In our study, we have examined whether the composition of payment instruments matters for the 
prevalence of corruption in a country. Participants in the illegal economy may prefer to use cash 
transactions, as these are the most difficult to trace for law enforcement purposes, but they can be 
difficult to use where large quantities are involved.  Other transaction methods, such as cheques and 
credit cards, may differ in their usefulness for law breakers or corrupt officials. While previous 
studies have examined related research questions - such as the nexus between the shadow economy 
and corruption  (Dreher and Schneider (2010)) and the possibility that corruption influences the de-
gree of regulations affecting a country’s capital account (Dreher and Siemers (2009)) - the impact 
of the composition of payment instruments on corruption has not been investigated.  
Using cross-country data for 12 advanced economies and panel estimation techniques, we 
find that the choice of transaction instrument matters for the prevalence of corruption. In particular, 
an increase in the use of paper-based transactions and cheques adds to corruption.  In contrast, 
transactions with credit cards reduce the prevalence of corruption.   The impact of credit cards on 
corruption is larger than that of cheques.  These results hold across various models and when allow-
ance is made for possible simultaneity between corruption and financial instruments (Table 3).  The 
findings with regard to economic prosperity, democracy and government size largely support the  
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extant literature (see Jain (2001), Lambsdorff (2006a), Monitola and Jackman (2002), Pellegrini and 
Gerlagh (2008), Serra (2006), Svensson (2005), Treisman (2000)).  
The  contrast  in  the  corruption  effects  for  paper  versus  nonpaper  transactions  and  for 
cheques versus credit cards is the overall story that consistently holds across regressions.  The rela-
tively strong findings are especially significant in light of the fact that the countries included in our 
(rather small) sample are generally the less corrupt nations. 
Our results suggest that policymakers seeking to control corruption would be well advised 
to facilitate the shift of the financial system from paper-based transactions to nonpaper based trans-
actions, including credit cards. In this regard, providing an environment that encourages financial 
innovation could be important, including allowing the entry of foreign banks with sophisticated 
payment services for their clientele. Similarly, minimizing the fees for retail transactions conducted 
via credit or debit cards could support their use in the economy more broadly, and according to our 
results impact the prevalence of corruption.  These results attain added importance with the growing 
trend towards e-money, such as multipurpose prepaid cards and prepaid software products using 
computer networks (digital cash). 
In closing, we add some caveats and possible extensions to this research. Obviously, our 
sample is limited due to constraints in the availability of comparable financial data across nations.  
Future work would benefit from expanding the sample to include some emerging economies, al-
though data availability will be an important issue here (see Knack and Keefer (1995), Treisman 
(2007)). Another interesting avenue would be to investigate whether financial development and in-
novation in general is hindered by the prevalence of corruption (see Goel and Hasan (2010)).    Rajeev K. Goel and Aaron Mehrotra 
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TABLE 1 Variable definitions, summary statistics, and data sources 
 
Variable  Definition 
(Mean; Std. dev.) 
Source 
CPIavg  Three-year moving average of Transparency Interna-
tional corruption perceptions index (CPI), 2002-08, 
(range: 0 to 10; higher values, less corruption), (7.97; 
1.19) 
www.transparency.org 
WBavg  Three-year moving average from of World Bank cor-
ruption perceptions index (WB), 2002-2008, (range: -
2.5 to +2.5; higher values, less corruption), (1.69; 
0.52) 
www.worldbank.org 
DEM  Sum of a country’s political rights and civil liberties 
scores, (higher score, more democratic), 2007; (-2.67; 
1.94) 
www.freedomhouse.org 
GDP  Real GDP per capita, ($16,040.41; 15,450.11)  World Development Indicators 
GOVT  General government final consumption expenditure, 
as % of GDP (19.45; 4.94) 
World Development Indicators 
ShNPAPR  Share of nonpaper based credit transfers by non-
banks in total transactions with payment instruments 
(0.69; 0.26) 
Bank for International Settlements (ww.bis.org); 
Statistics on payment and settlement systems in 
select countries.  
ShPAPR  Share of paper based credit transfers by non-banks in 
total transactions with payment instruments (0.15; 
0.19) 
Bank for International Settlements (ww.bis.org); 
Statistics on payment and settlement systems in 
select countries.  
ShCHQ  Share of cheque transactions by non-banks in total 
transactions with payment instruments (0.15; 0.22) 
Bank for International Settlements (ww.bis.org); 
Statistics on payment and settlement systems in 
select countries.  
ShCC  Share of credit card transactions by non-banks in total 
transactions with payment instruments (0.02; 0.02) 
Bank for International Settlements (ww.bis.org); 
Statistics on payment and settlement systems in 
select countries.  
ShDrDbt  Share of direct debit transactions by non-banks in 
total transactions with payment instruments (0.04; 
0.03) 
Bank for International Settlements (ww.bis.org); 
Statistics on payment and settlement systems in 
select countries.  
 
Note: Unless otherwise specified, the data comprise annual observations from 2004-2008 for the following countries: Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.  However, missing 














BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/ 2011 
 
 
  15 
Table 2  Financial payment modes and corruption 
Panel A (Dependent variable: ln((10-CPIavg)/CPIavg)) 
  2A.1  2A.2  2A.3  2A.4  2A.5 
ShNPAPR  -2.09** 
(5.6) 












ShCHQ          2.14** 
(2.1) 
ShCC          -30.91** 
(7.0) 
ShDrDbt          0.72 
(0.3) 
ShNPAPRsq        13.15** 
(5.0) 
 
ShPAPRsq        -27.46** 
(3.6) 
 










DEM              0.20* 
(1.8) 











2  0.64  0.81  0.82  0.91  0.63 
F-value  21.05**  65.03**  37.86**  45.50**  24.56** 
N  27  27  27  27  35 
Panel B: (Dependent variable: ln((5-(2.5+WBavg))/(2.5+WBavg))) 
  2B.1  2B.2  2B.3  2B.4  2B.5 
ShNPAPR  -1.93** 
(4.7) 












ShCHQ          2.21** 
(2.3) 
ShCC          -26.88** 
(6.3) 
ShDrDbt          -1.41 
(0.7) 
ShNPAPRsq        16.05** 
(4.6) 
 
ShPAPRsq        -33.49** 
(3.4) 
 










DEM              0.22* 
(1.9) 











2  0.59  0.73  0.74  0.88  0.61 
F-value  14.32**  34.98**  21.80**  20.09**  16.67** 
N  27  27  27  27  35 
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. A constant term was included in all OLS regressions, but to save space the corres-
ponding results are not reported. DEM was dropped from some models due to collinearity.  The numbers in parentheses are t- 
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TABLE 3   2SLS Regressions allowing for endogeneity of financial transactions 
 




  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.4 
ShNPAPR    -2.53** 
(4.7) 
  -2.31** 
(4.2) 
ShPAPR  2.58** 
(6.2) 
  2.33** 
(5.0) 
 
















F-value  23.96**  13.41**  15.73**  10.77** 
N  27  27  27  27 
First-stage F-value
  46.76**  29.92**  46.76**  29.92** 
Sargan over-










Note: Variable definitions appear in Table 1. The reported results are second-stage estimates for 2SLS regression, with economic 
freedom (EF) and population (POP) as additional instruments for ShPAPR and ShNPAPR, respectively. The numbers in parenthes-
es are absolute values of z-statistics.  ** denotes statistical significance at least at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The models 






Correlation matrix of key variables 
 
  CPIavg  WBavg  GOVT  GDP  ShNPAPR  ShPAPR  ShCHQ  ShCC  ShDrDbt 
CPIavg  1.00                 
WBavg  0.98  1.00               
GOVT  0.41  0.33  1.00             
GDP  0.01  0.10  -0.43  1.00           
ShNPAPR  0.81  0.77  0.57  -
0.01 
1.00         
ShPAPR  -0.88  -0.82  -0.42  0.24  -0.86  1.00       
ShCHQ  -0.15  -0.18  -0.44  -
0.37 
-0.47  -0.02  1.00     
ShCC  0.43  0.35  0.69  -
0.56 
0.16  -0.36  0.18  1.00   
ShDrDbt  0.03  0.14  -0.49  0.46  -0.33  0.30  -0.04  -0.13  1.00 
 
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. (N = 23) 
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